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A recent dispute emerged between prison officials and the Parole Board, over the release of Zahid Iqbal, a terrorist who was jailed for plotting an attack on a British army base in 2013. While the Parole Board approved his release three years early, offender managers deemed him too dangerous. This case highlights the role of risk in judicial decisions surrounding deradicalisation, yet it represents only one layer of the government’s wider approach. Britain’s strategy ranges from early social intervention to judicial containment, with extreme cases such as Shamima Begum’s prompting political action.
Where risk is determined to be its lowest, intervention occurs earliest in the radicalisation process. At the social level, the government operates the Prevent Scheme, a pillar of its wider CONTEST strategy, aimed at reducing the risk from terrorism.Designed to intervene before ideological views solidify, individuals perceived to be susceptible to extremist narratives are referred by professionals and peers. The aim is to safeguard rather than punish: to redirect the individual before they pose a risk to public safety.
Prevent therefore embodies the assumption that ideology at this stage can be reversed, emphasising education rather than prosecution. However, the record number of referrals in 2025 complicates the reality. This could be explained by greater vigilance but could also be explained by the broadening roles of ideology within these referrals. In recent years, 56% of referrals were categorised by “no ideology,” suggesting an increase in nihilism, making these individuals less predictable, undermining the interventive capabilities of the Prevent strategy. Ultimately, Prevent assess social risk, intervening before they culminate judicial cases.
When radicalisation transitions into terrorism-related offences, the risk exceeds the capacity of referral schemes, seeing judicial punishment. Unlike Prevent’s pre-crime rehabilitating programme, prosecution involves securitised containment, with the response increasing in proportion to the entrenchment of their ideology. At this stage, deradicalisation programmes remain, increasing in intensity: The government’s Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), introduced in 2016, aims to deradicalise through a tailored approach to the individual who has been involved in terrorism or related activities. As the ideologies are more hardened, participation can be mandatory and support is personalised to reduce the risk of the individual to public safety.
The case of Anjem Choudary saw him have to undertake this programme following his 2016 sentencing for extremist hate-preaching, The limitations of deradicalisation come to light, in Choudary since being found guilty of directing a terrorist organisation among other convictions. Despite intervention, Choudary continued to promote extremist views, having boasted about being the “number one radicaliser in Britain.” These convictions raise questions on the effectiveness of imprisonment and accompanied deradicalisation programmes, asked by parliamentary researchers and politicians. The cases of Choudary and Iqbal may show sentencing to temporarily contain terrorist ideologies, rather than dispel them. While states can judicially manage these individuals, the risk ultimately remains.
When efforts to deradicalise are deemed not sufficient, the state can enforce more serious power and revoke citizenship. The acknowledgement of risk being too high is central to these decisions, with the individual’s ideology being so entrenched, they are removed as a sovereign citizen. Shamima Begum, who travelled to Syria to join ISIS at age 15, is the most notable case of this occurrence. When found in a Syrian refugee camp, debates on whether a terrorist could be reintegrated into British society ensued. The UK government’s decision to strip Begum’s citizenship was questioned by the ECHR, to which the government defended the decision of the then-home secretary Savid Javid, emphasising the risk to national security. Extreme cases like Begum’s show the state’s recognition of the limits of rehabilitation and deradicalisation, with exile being one of the most severe actions a government can take in response to extremist ideologies.
Overall, the UK’s deradicalisation approach is not linear but layered, increasing in intensity. The greater the risk posed by an individual’s ideology, the more proportionate the response: early social action under the Prevent scheme, judicial containment accompanied by more sophisticated deradicalisation programmes, and in extreme scenarios, political action through citizenship removal. Ultimately, Britain’s layered approach is shaped by an assessment of how deep an ideology governs the individual, and the corresponding risk to national security.
Edited by: Daniel Groves
Image: Tents in Refugee Camp in Desert, Ahmed Akacha, 2021 // CC0
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