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Two weeks ago, the United States launched a series of airstrikes against Iranian military assets, framing the intervention as an effort to weaken the regime and “free the Iranian people.” President Donald Trump called on Iranians to “rise up,” suggesting that the removal of key military infrastructure would create the conditions for internal regime change. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed similar rhetoric.
According to Sky News defence analyst Michael Clarke, the strategic logic appears straightforward: degrade Iran’s leadership and defensive capacity sufficiently to allow domestic opposition to topple the regime from within. In theory, this avoids committing U.S. ground forces and prevents a repeat of the Iraq War or the War in Afghanistan interventions Trump has repeatedly criticised. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has since stated that Britain would “not support regime change from the air.”
But what does regime change from the air actually look like, and has it ever worked?
Since the First World War, airpower has been central to modern warfare. Yet historically it has functioned most effectively as part of a combined-arms strategy. Air superiority enables manoeuvre on land or sea; it rarely substitutes for it. Attempts to coerce political collapse through bombing alone have produced limited results.
The most familiar British example is the German bombing campaign during the Battle of Britain. Under Hermann Göring, the Luftwaffe sought to cripple Britain’s capacity and will to resist ahead of the planned invasion, Operation Sea Lion. The assumption was that sustained aerial bombardment would break morale and force political capitulation. Instead, British resistance hardened. Airpower alone proved insufficient to compel regime change or surrender.
The United States and its air force are not unfamiliar with these shortcomings. The Bay of Pigs invasion, which sought to land Cuban exiles in their homeland to depose Fidel Castro’s communist government, relied heavily on air support but failed due to inadequate coordination and insufficient ground strength. A few years later, the U.S. military attempted to support South Vietnam by helping to establish aerial dominance over the Viet Cong in the early stages of the Vietnam War. The failure of this policy to deliver any significant strategic advantage ultimately dragged the United States into a wider conflict, forcing it to commit ground troops; 58,000 of whom never made it home, lives given to a war it ultimately lost.
Supporters of air-led intervention may cite the 2011 NATO campaign in Libya. The Libyan Civil War saw a UN-backed no-fly zone weaken the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Yet even here, airpower operated in conjunction with internal rebel forces, regional dynamics, and formal international authorisation. Moreover, Libya’s post-intervention instability raises questions about what “success” truly meant.
The historical record suggests that weakening a regime’s military infrastructure does not automatically produce a popular uprising. While it remains unclear how this conflict will unfold, opening a history book may be the wisest course of action if Trump wishes to continue protecting American lives.
Editor’s Note:
This war has become an increasingly distressing situation and is now sending tremors through the global economy. For my own family, who are in the Middle East, I am scared. Lives and livelihoods are at stake. Stay safe.
Edited by Sanjanaa Radhakrishnan
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